The Illusion of Sustainability by Michael Kremer & Edward Miguel
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We thank ICS Africa and the Kenya Ministry of Health for their cooperation in all stages of the project,
and would especially like to acknowledge the contributions of Alicia Bannon, Elizabeth Beasley, Laban
Benaya, Simon Brooker, Pascaline Dupas, Alfred Luoba, Sylvie Moulin, Robert Namunyu, Carol
Nekesa, Peter Wafula Nasokho, Polycarp Waswa and the entire PSDP staff, without whom the project
would not have been possible. Gratitude is extended to the teachers, school children, and households of
Busia for participating in the study. Melissa Gonzalez-Brenes, Tina Green, Jean Lee, Emily Oster, and
Avery Ouellette have provided excellent research assistance. We thank Andrew Foster, Caroline Hoxby,
Guido Imbens, Botond Koszegi, Kaivan Munshi, Mark Rosenzweig, John Strauss, and Chris Udry for
helpful conversations. We are grateful for financial support from the World Bank, NIH Fogarty
International Center (R01 TW05612-02), and Berkeley Center for Health Research. All errors are our
own.  The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.  
©2004 by Michael Kremer and Edward Miguel.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.The Illusion of Sustainability
Michael Kremer and Edward Miguel
NBER Working Paper No. 10324
February 2004, Revised August 2006
JEL No. I1, I3, O2
ABSTRACT
The history of foreign development assistance is one of movement away from addressing immediate
needs and toward focusing on the underlying causes of poverty. A recent manifestation is the move
towards "sustainability," which stresses community mobilization, education, and cost-recovery. This
stands in contrast to the traditional economic analysis of development projects, with its focus on
providing  public  goods  and  correcting  externalities.  We  examine  evidence  from  randomized
evaluations on strategies for combating intestinal worms, which affect one in four people worldwide.
Providing medicine to treat worms was extremely cost effective, although medicine must be
provided twice per year indefinitely to keep children worm-free. An effort to promote sustainability
by educating Kenyan schoolchildren on worm prevention was ineffective, and a "mobilization"
intervention from psychology failed to boost deworming drug take-up. Take-up was highly sensitive
to drug cost: a small increase in cost led to an 80 percent reduction in take-up (relative to free
treatment). The results suggest that, in the context we examine, the pursuit of sustainability may be
















The history of overseas development assistance can be viewed as a series of attempts to identify and 
address ever more fundamental causes of global poverty. Oxfam, for example, founded in 1942 as the 
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, later shifted to “support for self-help schemes whereby 
communities improved their own water supplies, farming practices, and health provision”
1. In the 1950's 
and 1960's, it was widely argued that long-run economic performance depended on capital investment, 
and raising savings through a “big push” [Rosenstein-Rodin, 1943] would launch countries into self-
sustaining growth or “take-off” [Rostow, 1960]. Accordingly, the World Bank largely funded 
infrastructure like dams and roads.  By the 1980’s international financial institution policymakers decided 
that capital accumulation and technological progress depended not so much on investment and careful 
engineering, but rather on a better economic policy environment [Williamson, 1990; World Bank, 1993a]. 
Development assistance was extended conditionally to encourage countries to adopt economic policies 
associated with this “Washington Consensus” view, characterized by reduced tariffs, appropriate foreign 
exchange rates and low inflation. By the 1990’s, this approach also became seen as inadequate by many.  
According to a new consensus, these policies would have only limited impact in the absence of more 
fundamental institutional reforms [World Bank, 1998]. 
Part of this new consensus in overseas development assistance involved reforms to national level 
institutions, but given widespread central government failures in delivering public goods, another strand 
emphasized encouraging local communities to sustainably provide their own public goods. Whereas 
orthodox public finance analysis suggests that governments or donors should indefinitely fund activities 
that generate positive externalities, advocates of sustainability emphasize the importance of local project 
“ownership”, and promote public goods projects that only require start-up funding and can then continue 
without external support.  These efforts typically rely on voluntary activities by community members 
rather than on the granting of coercive fundraising powers to local governments. 
The idea that development projects should aim at financial sustainability through voluntary local 
action has had tremendous influence in development thinking, in areas from microfinance to the   2
environment.
2 In public health and water supply, sustainability advocates concentrate on cost-recovery 
from beneficiaries, community mobilization, and health education rather than simply building wells or 
subsidizing medical treatments that generate externalities. The idea of replacing dependency on aid with a 
one-time investment that leads to long-run sustainability is certainly ideologically attractive. 
Yet anecdotal evidence suggests that financial sustainability has often been an illusion, and 
sometimes a costly one. Morduch [1999] argues that the pursuit of sustainability by microfinance 
organizations has led them to move away from serving the poor.  Meuwissen [2002] argues that a health 
cost-recovery program in Niger led to unexpectedly large drops in health care utilization, and that the 
local health committees set up by the program failed in most of their responsibilities. In a large water 
project in the Kenyan area we study, 43% of borehole wells were useless ten years after the shift from 
external donor support for water-well maintenance to the training of local maintenance committees 
[Miguel and Gugerty, 2005]. 
While it is certainly true that in some cases communities have developed institutions that lead 
individuals to contribute to local public goods [Ostrom, 1990],  it is less clear that external interventions, 
such as training sessions or the formation of user committees by donors, reliably lead to sustainable 
voluntary provision of local public goods. It is difficult for outsiders to understand how other societies’ 
institutions and politics function, let alone how to influence them in a way that creates the correct 
incentives and does not generate unforeseen negative consequences. 
In this paper we seek to shed light on these issues using evidence from a randomized evaluation of a 
deworming program in Kenya. Intestinal worms infect one in four people worldwide.  They can be fought 
in several different ways. One approach emphasizes periodic medical treatment with low-cost drugs. 
Public provision of deworming medicine can likely be justified on standard public finance grounds since 
an estimated three quarters of the social benefit of treatment comes through reducing disease transmission 
[Miguel and Kremer, 2004]. However, some argue that too much emphasis has been placed on just 
handing out deworming drugs. Since people soon become reinfected, deworming drug treatment must be 
continued twice per year indefinitely. In a Lancet article entitled “Sustainable Schistosomiasis Control –   3
The Way Forward,” Utzinger et al. [2003] argue that rather than focusing narrowly on drugs, a broader 
approach with greater emphasis on health education would be more sustainable. Other potential ways to 
make anti-worm programs sustainable include requiring cost-sharing payments from those taking the 
drugs, promoting the diffusion of worm prevention information and behaviors through social networks, 
and encouraging local ownership of deworming programs. 
In this study we find that, first, the introduction of a small fee for deworming drugs (“cost-
sharing”) led to an 80% reduction in treatment rates, consistent with the hypothesis that people have low 
private valuation for deworming. Take-up dropped sharply when going from a zero price to a positive 
price but was not sensitive to the exact (positive) price level, suggesting that it may be particularly 
counter-productive to charge small positive prices for the treatment of infectious diseases.  Second, an 
intensive school health education intervention had no impact on worm prevention behaviors. Third, a 
verbal commitment “mobilization” intervention – in which people were asked in advance whether they 
planned to take deworming drugs, exploiting a finding from social psychology that individuals strive for 
consistency in their statements and actions – had no impact on adoption. 
We also examine peer effects in adoption, since if imitation effects in technology adoption are 
sufficiently strong, then a sufficiently large temporary investment to introduce deworming drugs could 
move society from a low-adoption to a high-adoption equilibrium.  A number of recent papers, including 
Foster and Rosenzweig [1995], Conley and Udry [2000], Burke et al. [2003], and Munshi [2004] find 
evidence for peer effects in technology adoption using nonexperimental data. Like Like Duflo and Saez 
[2003], we exploit experimental variation in exposure to a new technology to address the well-known 
econometric challenges in estimating peer effects [Manski, 1993]. We develop a theoretical framework 
that allows for peer effects from pure imitation, social learning about how to use technologies optimally, 
social learning about the benefits of new technologies, and epidemiological externalities. This model 
suggests that as long as a small fraction of the population receives subsidies sufficient to induce their 
adoption, further subsidies will affect steady state take-up only in the presence of imitation effects. We 
collect data on the network structure of links between school communities and use this to empirically   4
estimate the impact on adoption decisions not only of individuals’ direct social links, but also of higher-
order social links. Rather than imposing a preexisting definition of social links, based for example on 
geography [Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Burke et al., 2003], we allow survey respondents to specify 
their social links themselves and estimate the impact of learning through different types of links. We then 
simulate the impact of alternative ways of seeding the new technology given the observed network 
structure of links across schools in our sample. 
We find that additional social links to early treatment schools reduce the probability that children 
take deworming drugs, and increase the probability that parents say that deworming drugs are “not 
effective”. This negative take-up result holds both for direct social links and for indirect second order 
connections. We find evidence that Granovetter’s [1973] “weak ties” are important, with individuals 
learning both from “close” and “distant” contacts, as measured by the frequency with which they 
communicate. There is also some evidence for learning through child networks, in addition to the parent 
networks that form the core of the analysis. In contrast, analysis of our data using nonexperimental 
methods would imply that individuals are more likely to take the drugs if they have greater social contact 
with others who have recently been exposed to deworming, suggesting substantial omitted variable bias in 
the nonexperimental estimates. 
The lower take-up among those with more knowledge may be due to the high proportion of 
deworming benefits flowing not to the treated child or her family, but to others in the local community 
through externalities. People may only have realized how much of the benefits were external as they 
gained experience with the program. Negative social effects on take-up are especially large empirically 
for families with more schooling, a group who start out with particularly favorable beliefs about the 
technology but then rapidly revise their beliefs downwards as they acquire more information.  
Our results are consistent with peer effects due to learning from others about the benefits of the 
technology, and suggest that at least in this context, peer effects due to imitation, or due to learning about 
how to use the technology, are small. In this context, a policymaker uncertain about the benefits of a new   5
technology might want to subsidize a small number of people to adopt in hopes of spurring a shift to a 
new equilibrium, but temporary subsidies beyond this level would not affect steady-state adoption. 
Overall, the empirical results on cost-sharing, health education, and social learning, are all 
consistent with the hypothesis that people put limited private value on deworming. Miguel and Kremer 
[2004], however, suggest the social value is large. Together these results suggest that large ongoing 
external subsidies may be necessary to sustain high take-up. These results may generalize to other 
infectious and parasitic diseases characterized by large positive treatment externalities. More generally, it 
is probably an illusion to think that a one-time infusion of external assistance will lead to the indefinitely 
sustainable voluntary provision of most local public goods. There may simply be no alternative to 
ongoing subsidies financed by tax revenue raised either from local or national governments, or 
international donors.
3 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides information on worm 
infections and the project we study. In Section III we present a simple theoretical framework for 
understanding the determinants of deworming take-up.  Section IV describes the empirical take-up 
impacts of direct and higher-order social links. Sections V, VI, and VII describe the cost-sharing, health 
education, and verbal commitment results, respectively. The final section discusses broader implications 
for public finance and development assistance in less developed countries. Readers interested primarily in 
social learning may wish to focus on sections III and IV while those interested in development policy 
issues could focus mainly on sections V through VIII.  
  
II. The Primary School Deworming Project 
Over 1.3 billion people worldwide are infected with hookworm, 1.3 billion with roundworm, 900 million 
with whipworm, and 200 million with schistosomiasis [Bundy 1994]. Most have light infections, which 
are often asymptomatic, but more severe worm infections can lead to iron-deficiency anemia, protein 
energy malnutrition, stunting, wasting, listlessness, and abdominal pain. Heavy schistosomiasis infections 
can have even more severe consequences.
4   6
Helminths do not reproduce within the human host, so high worm burdens are the result of 
frequent reinfection. The geohelminths (hookworm, roundworm, and whipworm) are transmitted through 
ingestion of, or contact with, infected fecal matter. This can occur, for example, if children defecate in the 
fields near their home or school, areas where they also play. Schistosomiasis is acquired through contact 
with infected freshwater. For example, in our Kenyan study area people often walk to nearby Lake 
Victoria to bathe and fish. Medical treatment for helminth infections creates externality benefits by 
reducing worm deposition in the community and thus limiting reinfection among other community 
members [Anderson and May, 1991].  The geohelminths and schistosomiasis can be treated using the 
low-cost single-dose oral therapies of albendazole and praziquantel, respectively. The drugs sometimes 
cause unpleasant and salient, but medically minor, side effects including stomach ache, diarrhea, fever 
and occasionally vomiting [WHO, 1992], but these effects rarely last more than one day.  Side effects are 
more severe for heavier schistosomiasis infections, but can be mitigated by not consuming the drugs on 
an empty stomach. Private benefits of deworming may not always be particularly salient to individuals 
since they typically occur gradually as individual nutritional status improves in the months following 
treatment. 
Miguel and Kremer [2004] found that deworming treatment can generate large externality 
benefits by interfering with disease transmission. Providing treatment to Kenyan school children led to 
large reductions in worm infections and increased school participation among both treated and untreated 
children in the treatment schools, and among children in neighboring schools. Three quarters of the social 
benefit of treatment was in the form of externalities. Since deworming costs only $3.50 per extra year of 
school participation generated, it is likely one of the most cost-effective ways to boost participation. 
Both this paper and Miguel and Kremer [2004] study the Primary School Deworming Project 
(PSDP), a school health program carried out by a Dutch non-governmental organization (NGO), ICS 
Africa, in cooperation with the Kenyan Ministry of Health. The project took place in Busia district, a poor 
and densely-settled farming region in western Kenya, and the 75 project schools include nearly all rural 
primary schools in the area, with over 30,000 enrolled pupils between the ages of six and 18, over 90% of   7
whom suffer from intestinal worm infections. In January 1998, the schools were randomly divided into 
three groups (Group 1, Group 2, and Group 3) of twenty-five schools each: the schools were first divided 
by administrative sub-unit (zone) and by involvement in other non-governmental assistance programs, 
and were then listed alphabetically and every third school assigned to a given project group. 
The intervention included both health education on worm prevention behaviors and the provision 
of deworming medicine. Due to administrative and financial constraints the program was phased in over 
several years. Group 1 schools received assistance in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001, and Group 2 schools in 
1999, 2000 and 2001, while Group 3 began receiving assistance in 2001. This design implies that in 1998 
Group 1 schools were treatment schools, while Group 2 and Group 3 schools were the comparison 
schools; and in 1999 and 2000 Group 1 and Group 2 schools were the treatment schools and Group 3 
schools were comparison schools. At each school, the project started out with a community meeting of 
parents and teachers organized by the NGO, which included a discussion of worm infections, the nature 
of medical deworming treatment, and worm prevention measures. All primary school communities in the 
baseline sample agreed to participate in the project. Starting in 1999, the Ministry of Health required 
signed individual parental consent, while in 1998 only community consent had been required, with 
individuals having the ability to opt out of the program if they wished. This change in 1999 may have 
reduced take-up in some cases if parents were reluctant to visit the school headmaster, particularly if they 
were late on other school fee payments. 
Health education efforts focused on preventing worms through hand washing, wearing shoes, and 
avoiding infected fresh water. This included classroom lectures and culturally appropriate Swahili 
language health education materials. This health education effort was considerably more intensive than is 
typical in Kenyan primary schools, and thus the program may be more likely than existing government 
programs to impact child behavior. Two teachers in each school attended a full day training session on 
worm prevention lessons as well as on the details of the deworming program, and were instructed to 
impart these lessons during school hours. These classroom lessons were supplemented through lectures   8
by an experienced NGO field team (the team leader was a trained Public Health Technician) which visited 
each treatment school several times per year. 
At all schools where helminth prevalence was sufficiently high, the project provided periodic 
treatment with deworming drugs to be taken at the school. The World Health Organization has endorsed 
mass school-based deworming in areas with prevalence over 50% since mass treatment eliminates the 
need for costly individual screening [Warren et al., 1993; WHO, 1987], and the drugs are cheap when 
purchased in bulk.
5 
Our best estimate is that teacher training, teacher lessons at school, the lectures delivered by the 
NGO field team, and the classroom wall-charts and other educational materials taken together cost at least 
US$0.44 per pupil per year in the assisted schools
6 – which is comparable to the total cost of deworming 
drug purchase and delivery in a nearby Tanzanian program, at US$0.49 [PCD, 1999]. In our case, it is 
difficult to break out the costs of health education, data collection, and drug delivery since the same field 
team was responsible for all activities, so cost estimates should be seen as approximate. 
  The NGO we worked with has a policy of using community cost-recovery in its projects to 
promote sustainability and confer project ownership on beneficiaries. In the case of deworming, the NGO 
temporarily waived this policy initially, and then planned to phase it in gradually. The 50 Group 1 and 
Group 2 schools were stratified by treatment group and geographic location and then 25 were randomly 
selected (using a computer random number generator) to pay user fees for medical treatment in 2001, 
while the other 25 continued to receive free medical treatment that year; all Group 3 schools received free 
treatment in 2001. The deworming fee was set on a per family basis like most Kenyan primary school 
fees at the time. This introduced within-school variation in the per child cost of deworming since 
households have different numbers of primary school children, variation that we also use to estimate the 
effect of price on drug take-up. Of the 25 Group 1 and Group 2 schools participating in cost-sharing, two 
thirds received albendazole at a cost of 30 Kenyan shillings per family (US$0.40 in 2001) and one third 
received both albendazole and praziquantel at a cost of 100 shillings (approximately US$1.30). Whether 
praziquantel was given depended on the local prevalence of schistosomiasis. Since parents have 2.7   9
children in school on average, the average cost of deworming per child in cost-sharing schools was 
slightly more than US$0.30 – still a heavily subsidized price, about one fifth the cost of drug purchase 
and delivery through this program (at US$1.49) and 60% of the cost in the Tanzania program.
7 
The study area seems fertile ground for encouraging voluntary community provision of local 
public goods like deworming control. Kenya has a long history of community self-help programs, and 
indeed the national motto of “Harambee” refers to such programs.  The project we examine was 
conducted at primary schools, one of the most widespread and firmly established institutions in rural 
Kenya. All primary schools have a committee composed of parents and community representatives, and 
historically these committees have been entrusted with raising funds locally for most non-salary costs of 
running the school, including everything from chalk to classroom construction. 
Cultural understandings of health, and particularly worms, in our study area also merit a brief 
discussion; this account draws heavily on the work of Geissler [1998a, 1998b, 2000], who studies 
deworming take-up in the Kenyan district that borders our study area. Medical anthropologists have long 
pointed out that people can simultaneously hold traditional and biomedical views of health, in a manner 
similar to religious syncretism, and Geissler argues that this is the case for views about worms in western 
Kenya. In the traditional view, worms are an integral part of the human body and necessary for digestion, 
and many infection symptoms are attributed to malevolent occult forces (“witchcraft”) or breaking taboos 
[Government of Kenya, 1986]. Educated people are more likely to engage in the biomedical discourse 
and thus more likely to treat illnesses medically rather than using traditional remedies. Geissler finds that 
most people do not place much value on deworming treatment because worms are not seen as a pressing 
health problem, especially compared to malaria and HIV/AIDS.
8 As a result, there was almost no 
deworming outside the school health program he studies, and most children relied on local herbal 
remedies to alleviate the abdominal discomfort caused by worms. 
Local knowledge regarding private benefits of receiving treatment under a mass deworming 
program was likely very poor in our study area. The project we study was the first mass deworming 
treatment program in the district, to our knowledge. Albendazole and praziquantel were only approved for   10
human use in the mid-1980s and by 1998 were still rarely used in the area. Prior to the program, fewer 
than five percent of people reported taking deworming drugs [Miguel and Kremer, 2004]. While many 
medicines, such as aspirin and anti-malarials, are cheaply available in nearly all local shops, deworming 
was only available in a few shops and at high mark-ups, presumably due to a thin market. In fact, none of 
64 local shops surveyed in 1999 had either albendazole (or its close substitute, mebendazole) or 
praziquantel in stock, though a minority carried less effective deworming drugs (levamisole 
hydrochloride and piperazine). Albendazole and praziquantel were available in some local health clinics. 
Inference about likely mass treatment impacts based on observed individual impacts was complicated for 
local residents by non-random selection into treatment, as well as the possibility of spillover effects. 
 
III. A Framework for Understanding the Adoption of a New Health Technology 
We model the spread of information and the evolution of take-up of a new technology in a social network.  
The model provides a framework for the empirical estimation of adoption peer effects and helps clarify 
the conditions under which a one-time subsidy can change the long-run level of adoption and thus achieve 
“sustainability”. 
We develop a simple framework in which people adopt deworming if expected private benefits 
exceed the expected cost.  They are heterogeneous both in their taste for deworming and in their priors 
about the effectiveness of the drugs. People are linked in a social network and receive signals about 
adoption, drug effectiveness, and how to use the drugs. The model nests four types of peer effects 
proposed in the existing literature.  Others’ adoption can (i) influence own adoption through the disease 
environment, (ii) directly enter the utility function through a pure imitation effect, (iii) provide 
information about how to effectively use the technology (as in Jovanovic and Nyarko [1996] or Foster 
and Rosenzweig [1995]),  or (iv) provide information on the benefits of the technology (as in Banerjee 
[1992] or Ellison and Fudenberg [1993]). 
 
A. Assumptions   11
We assume that an individual i decides to adopt a new technology (or health practice) if the expected 
private benefits are greater than the costs, conditional on her prior beliefs and the information received 
from social contacts. As noted above, the cost of deworming adoption is privately incurred, immediate 
and salient, while much of the benefit is in the form of externalities and even the private benefits are 
delayed, so private benefits may not exceed costs, particularly for people with high discount rates. 
Suppose that the total private benefit to taking the deworming drug depends on the individual’s 
infection level γ ; the effectiveness of the drug φ (which incorporates the percentage reduction in worm 
load that results from taking the drug and the rapidity of re-infection)
 9; and an idiosyncratic individual 
specific taste for deworming μi which is assumed to have a continuous distribution with no mass points 
and a sufficiently large support such that some individuals always take up the drug. (Note that 
policymakers can always guarantee that some take up the drug, by heavily subsidizing a small fraction of 
consumers.) Individual infection γ  may depend on individual characteristics X, and also on others' 
treatment history. Because worms are transmitted through environmental contamination rather than from 
person to person, infection levels are likely to depend on average population treatment, rather than an 
individual’s social links.  
Financial, time, or utility costs of treatment are denoted by C > 0.  Below we allow for the 
possibility that people may learn from their own experience and from others about how to reduce the cost 
of using the technology (for example, how to control side effects by taking food with the medicine), but, 
as in Jovanovic and Nyarko [1996] and Foster and Rosenzweig [1995], we assume this learning is 
bounded so that C approaches some positive C∞.  The drug subsidies, health education, and verbal 
commitment interventions discussed in sections V, VI, and VII can be regarded as changing the adoption 
cost. 
Finally, a desire to imitate one’s social contacts may influence the decision to take up the 
technology.  The parameter β > 0 captures the importance of this effect.     12
Let  it φ ˆ denote the individual’s beliefs in period t about drug effectiveness φ conditional on prior 
beliefs and any signals received, and let Tit∈{0, 1} be an indicator variable for drug take-up in period t. 
Then the individual’s expected private benefit from adoption can be expressed as  
(1)   () () [] ( ) it i it it it it C h T U T U E βω μ γ φ + − = = − = ˆ 0 1  
where U is individual utility from deworming, conditional on the treatment choices of other individuals, 
and  it ω  is the share of social contacts who took up the drug in the previous period.  
  We assume that individuals decide whether to adopt deworming at time t based on the current 
costs and benefits of adoption, and do not consider the additional motive of adopting in order to learn 
more about the impact of the technology or how to use it in the future. This is partly to keep the model 
tractable, but is also a reasonable assumption in our context.  Discount rates were likely high given the 
temporary nature of the program and the limited foresight of schoolchildren.  Moreover, deworming was 
introduced at the level of whole schools, so most people offered the chance to take it would have many 
opportunities to learn about impacts from classmates, limiting the marginal value of their own experience.   
 
B. Information Structure 
At the moment the new technology is introduced, individual i has a prior belief about the effectiveness of 
taking deworming medicine as part of a mass campaign, denoted φi0, which may be greater or less than 
the actual effectiveness φ.  Priors could be less than φ due to traditional beliefs about worms in the study 
region [Geissler, 1998a, 1998b]. However, people could also have had overly optimistic estimates about 
private benefits. The enthusiasm of NGO field officers promoting deworming at schools may have 
reflected the drugs’ social rather than private benefits. Although the scripts made clear that the medicine 
kills worms in the body but does not prevent reinfection, people may not have realized how quickly they 
would be reinfected. Moreover, if people estimated their expected private benefits by comparing 
individuals in treatment versus comparison schools, they would incorrectly assign some of the school-  13
wide treatment externality to private benefits, again making prior beliefs about private deworming 
benefits overly optimistic. 
Priors about deworming effectiveness could also vary systematically with individual 
characteristics, such as education. This is a departure from the standard assumption of common priors but 
is plausible for Kenya. In the context of rural Kenya, formal schooling is considered an important 
predictor of favorable views about new health technologies [Akwara, 1996; Kohler et al., 2001].  This 
could reflect either the causal impact of education, or simply the fact that people who are more open to 
“modern” or “Western” ideas and technologies obtain more education. We formalize this variation in 
prior beliefs by modeling the common effectiveness parameter φ as a draw from a distribution believed to 
have mean φ0(Xi) and variance σ0
2. While people can learn about the realization of φ through signals from 
their social links, beliefs about its distribution need not have converged to a common prior before the 
program intervention since mass deworming had not taken place in the area before. 
All individuals who take the drug obtain a signal about effectiveness. These signals are noisy due 
to individual time-specific shocks to health status (e.g., malaria, typhoid, cholera) that are hard to 
distinguish from drug effects.  Let these signals have mean φ and variance σε
2. 
We assume information diffuses through an infinite social network with a simple structure in 
which the network, viewed from the perspective of any node, is a proper tree.  This implies that a single 
path connects any two nodes.
10 Each individual has m direct social links, people with whom they may 
exchange information, where m is a positive integer. Each of those links, in turn, also has m direct links. 
In the special case where m=2, this is equivalent to people being arrayed along an infinite line, each with 
direct links to two immediate neighbors. 
Time is discrete. At the beginning of each period, individuals can send messages to their direct 
links with information both from their own signals received and from others’ signals. Signals are 
transmitted to each link with probability p each period.  Later in the same period, people receive these   14
messages from their social contacts.  These lags in information diffusion are consistent with the data from 
Kenya, as discussed below.
  
 
C. Steady State Adoption 
We first solve the steady state of this model, before turning to the transition path.  
  Note that in our model as long as some fraction of people always adopt, information will 
eventually diffuse completely. This implies that in steady state  φ φ = it ˆ and C = C∞ for all individuals i. 
Consider first the case in which 0 = β  (no pure imitation effects). Let λ denote the share of the 
population taking up treatment and let λ* denote the steady state share such that if a proportion λ* of the 
population took the drug in the past, the same proportion will find it optimal to take the drug. An 
individual will adopt in the steady state if:   
(2)     () () 0 *, > − ∞ C X h i i μ λ γ φ  
and forgo treatment if not. It is straightforward to show that there exists a unique equilibrium cutoff 
value () () {} ( ) ∫∫ ⋅ > − = ∞ μ μ μ λ γ φ λ dXd X P C X h , 0 *, 1
* , where P(X, μ) denotes the probability of those 
values occurring in the population.
11 
While λ* is unique if  0 = β , there can be multiple steady states under sufficiently strong pure 
imitation effects, in which others' take-up decisions directly enter the utility function in a manner  
complementary with own take-up. Even if parameters are such that λ* is arbitrarily close to zero in the 
absence of imitation effects, if imitation effects are sufficiently strong that 
() () {} i i i X h C μ γ φ β , 1 min − > ∞  , there will be another steady state in which everyone uses the 
technology since then:   () () 0 , 1 > + − ∞ β μ γ φ C X h i i  for all i.  A sufficiently large temporary subsidy can 
in this case lead to a switch from the partial use equilibrium to the full use equilibrium, leading to 
sustainable increases in take-up.   15
  Peer effects in technology adoption are sometimes cited as a rationale for why temporary 
subsidies may have long run effects. The model suggests that subsidizing a small number of people will 
be sufficient to ensure that those people will learn both the returns to the technology and how to best use 
the technology. In the absence of pure imitation effects, this will be enough to assure widespread long-run 
adoption of technologies with positive private returns.
12 There is no need to subsidize a large number of 
people to achieve steady state diffusion. While this result is specific to this particular model, we 
conjecture that similar results will apply under other Bayesian learning models. If policymakers are 
uncertain about the benefits of a particular technology, then providing heavy subsidies to a few people 
seems much more prudent than widely subsidizing what may turn out to be an unattractive technology.
13  
 
D. Take-up along the Transition Path 
We next turn to modeling take-up along the transition path. By time τ, the probability that a signal is 
transmitted from a first-order link to the receiver is [1 – (1 – p)
τ], the probability that signal is transmitted 
from a second-order link to the receiver is [∑k = 2…τ (k–1)⋅{p
2(1 – p)
k – 2}], and more generally the 


















 for j ≤ τ, and 0 
for j > τ. 
Holding fixed the take-up behavior of intermediate nodes, the direct impact of an additional 
signal acquired by a jth order link on take-up is then the probability that the signal is transmitted, 
multiplied by an indicator for whether the receiver changes her take-up decision in response to the new 
signal. Let i index an individual node as above.  Take-up occurs (Tit = 1) if and only if E[U(Tit = 1) – 
U(Tit = 0)] > 0, and the direct impact of an additional signal from a jth order link by time τ is thus: 
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An additional signal can impact take-up behavior, so that  ( ) ( ) [ ] signal   No   Signal   it it T T −  is 
nonzero, by changing beliefs about φ (or similarly by reducing the cost of take-up C, as discussed below).    16
If a Bayesian individual has 
E
it N  total signals from early treatment school links, both direct (first-order) 
and indirect (higher-order), she then weights her prior beliefs and signals received from social links such 
that the posterior belief on expected effectiveness becomes: 
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where φ0(Xi)  is the mean of her prior distribution, φS is the sample average of signals received through the 




it N  denotes the variance of the sample average.  As individuals accumulate 
more signals through their social network, the variance of the sample average goes to zero, and the value 
of both the sample average and posterior beliefs approach the true expected effectiveness, φ. 
When the prior belief is greater than the true expected effectiveness (φ0(Xi) > φ), individuals with 
more early treatment social links tend to have falling posterior beliefs about expected effectiveness, and 
thus the likelihood of adoption declines in the number of early treatment links. From equation 4, the 
decline in the expected benefit of treatment with respect to early links will be convex, as the posterior 
asymptotically approaches the true expected effectiveness. Similarly, when the prior is less than the true 
expected effectiveness, the posterior asymptotically approaches the true benefit from below. When φ0(Xi) 
> φ for all education levels (Xi) and the prior is increasing in Xi, then individuals with more education 
generally have higher adoption, but additional early links will lead to sharper drops in their adoption. 
Similarly, the framework allows for the possibility that people may learn from signals they 
receive as well as from their own experience about how to use the technology so C(•) is a decreasing 
function of the total number of signals ever received about the technology, 
E
it N , with C′(•) < 0, C′′ (•) > 
0, C(0) > 0, and C(∞) = C∞. 
Although epidemiological effects are likely to depend on the broader population rather than 
immediate social contacts, because worm infections result from contamination of water or soil rather than 
direct person-to-person transmission, it is worth considering the possibility that children whose families   17
have close social interactions with households in early treatment schools may experience somewhat lower 
helminth infection rates and thus reductions in infection intensity. We model this by allowing the 
infection level to be a function of the share of direct social contacts treated. 
The impact of early treatment links on the expected private benefits to adoption is thus  
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The first right-hand side term is the social effect from information on drug effectiveness, and can 
be positive or negative depending on the difference between priors and true private adoption benefits. The 
second term captures the social effect from learning how to use the drugs described above, and is always 
positive. The third term is the infection social effect, which should be negative because having more early 
treatment links could lead to a lower individual infection level (due to epidemiological externalities), 
which in turn reduces treatment benefits. The positive imitation effect is captured in the fourth term. 
We conclude that, to the extent that we observe negative overall social effects empirically, this is 
evidence that the combined effect of the information and infection externalities is larger than the learning-
by-doing effect plus the pure imitation effect.  Furthermore, since infection externalities appear small 
empirically, as we show below, we interpret negative estimated social effects as strong evidence that 
social effects work through the transmission of information about drug effectiveness.  We find no 
evidence for learning-by-doing or imitation here, although we cannot rule out small effects of these types. 
These formulae describe the impact of an additional signal holding fixed the behavior of 
intermediate nodes in the social network. In the long run, with repeated opportunities for adoption, there 
will be additional effects mediated by the effect of a link’s information on the take-up behavior of 
intermediate nodes, and thus on the subsequent number of signals that intermediate nodes possess and can 
send to the receiver, as well as any effects on the information and take-up of intermediate nodes mediated   18
by imitation effects. These indirect effects would accumulate over time, but since in our experiment 
people could only adopt every six months, and they were only able to adopt the drugs through the 
program for either zero, two or three years (depending on their treatment group), we focus above on the 
case in which the direct effects of signals dominate the indirect effects.  In section 4.6, though, we report 
results from a simulation of the transition path allowing for these indirect effects.  
 
IV. Empirical Results on Networks, Social Learning and Technology Adoption 
A. Data, Measurement, and Estimation 
We test whether households with more social links to schools randomly chosen for early treatment were 
more likely to take deworming drugs, conditional on their total number of links to all project schools. 
The PSDP Parent Questionnaire was collected in 2001 during household visits among a 
representative subsample of parents with children currently enrolled in Group 2 and Group 3 schools. A 
representative subsample of children (typically 10 to 17 years old) present in school on the survey day 
were administered a Pupil Questionnaire.  
Parent Questionnaire respondents were asked for information on their closest social links: the five 
friends they speak with most frequently, the five relatives they speak with most frequently, additional 
social contacts whose children attend local primary schools, and individuals with whom they speak 
specifically about child health issues. These individuals are collectively referred to as the respondent’s 
direct “social links.” The survey also collected information on the deworming treatment status of social 
links’ children and the effects of treatment on their health, how frequently the respondent speaks with 
each social link, which primary schools links’ children attend, the global positioning system (GPS) 
location of the respondent’s home, and the respondent’s knowledge of worm infections and attitudes 
toward deworming. The Parent Questionnaire was administered in two rounds in 2001 with households 
randomly allocated between the rounds. The Round 2 survey collected more detailed information on the 
impact of deworming on links’ children. Two different samples are used in the analysis. Sample 1   19
contains the 1,678 parents surveyed in either Round 1 or 2 with complete child treatment and parent 
social network data.
14  Sample 2 contains the 886 parents surveyed in Round 2. 
On average, parent respondents have 10.2 direct (first-order) social links with children in primary 
school, of whom 4.4 attend the respondent’s child’s own school, 2.8 attend other project schools (Groups 
1, 2, or 3), and 1.9 attend nearby “early treatment schools” (Groups 1 and 2—Table I, panel A). There is 
considerable variation in the number of direct early treatment links: the standard deviation is 2.0, and 
approximately one third of respondents have no social links to Group 1 or 2 schools, one third have one 
or two links, and one third have three or more links. 
  Approximately 40 parents were surveyed in each Group 2 and Group 3 school to construct 
second-order link measures. For each school we compute the average number of links that parents have to 
early treatment (Group 1, Group 2) schools and to late treatment (Group 3) schools, once again excluding 
links to their own school. We do not have information on the social links’ own social contacts at the 
individual level, and so rely on average school social network contacts in the higher-order analysis. In all 
main specifications, we exclude all self-referential links, in other words, all direct and higher-order links 
back to the respondent’s own school. 
The school average of second order social connections is likely to be a noisy proxy for the true 
individual level second-order measures, first due to idiosyncratic variation in the number of social 
contacts to particular schools, and second due to the fact that the social network data is based on surveys 
with samples of Group 2 and 3 parents alone, rather than with all parents in all local schools. This 
measurement error should not be systematically correlated with the randomized deworming group 
assignment of social contacts’ schools, preserving the identification strategy. However, it is likely to 
generate some attenuation bias towards zero in the estimated impact of second (and higher) order social 
contacts on deworming take-up. 
In order to keep the theoretical framework tractable, above we considered a network of 
individuals with uncorrelated signals arranged in a proper tree such that two individuals are linked by a 
single pathway and there are no redundant links. In practice, however, signals on the impact of   20
deworming are likely to be correlated among individuals within the same school (due to the geographic 
proximity of particular local schools), and there will be cases in which school A is linked directly to 
school B both directly through first order links, and indirectly through second order links to school C 
which in turn has direct links to School B.  In such cases, the second order links will still convey some 
new information since the correlation among signals within a school is not perfect, but they are likely to 
convey less additional information than second-order links to a school where an individual has no direct 
first-order links. We focus below on specifications that exclude all such redundant higher-order links to a 
school, but results are similar when redundant links are included (results not shown). 
Parents have 2.9 second-order social links to early treatment schools (standard deviation 2.9) and 
4.5 second-order links to all program schools (excluding the respondent’s own school, Table I Panel A). 
There remains considerable variation in these second-order link measures across individuals, and similar 
patterns hold for third-order social links. 
We have also examined the structure of social connections among the 50 Group 2 and Group 3 
schools with complete social network data. In our data there is not a marked sense in which some schools 
are net “senders” and others net “receivers” of information. The social network is remarkably symmetric: 
the correlation coefficient of the average number of social links to school A named by individuals in 
school B, and the average number of links to school B named by individuals in school A, is high at 0.82. 
The pattern of connections between schools is most strongly influenced by physical distance: for every 
additional 10 km separating two schools, the average number of named links falls by 0.06 (standard error 
0.005, statistically significant at 99% confidence). Perhaps surprisingly, schools with the same dominant 
ethnic group do not have significantly more social connections, nor do schools with similar test score 
results. An indicator for the location of one of the schools in a market center is not statistically 
significantly associated with more social connections at traditional confidence levels (regressions not 
shown). Thus there does not appear to be huge scope for take-up gains here by exploiting knowledge of 
the social network to optimally “seed” deworming interventions, and we expand on this point below in 
the simulations (section IV.F).   21
The social effect analysis with parent network data is conducted at the household level using 
probit estimation, and the outcome measure takes on a value of one if any child in the household was 
treated with deworming drugs in 2001, and zero otherwise (although results are similar if the analysis is 
conducted using the child as the unit of observation, results not shown).
15  Tij is the main dependent 
variable, the 2001 treatment indicator, where i is a household in school j. The idiosyncratic deworming 
benefit term, eij, captures unobserved variation in parent beliefs about deworming benefits, tastes for 
deworming, or the costs of obtaining treatment (for instance, whether the pupil was sick on the treatment 
day, which increases the cost of walking to school). The individual treatment decision becomes Tij = 




ij e b X a N ), where 
E
ij N  is a vector of social links to early treatment schools, defined in 
2001 as the Group 1 and 2 schools (not including the respondent’s own school). This vector may include 
both direct (first-order) social links as well as higher-order exposure to early treatment schools. 
Among the explanatory variables, Xij, we include total links to all program schools other than the 
respondent’s own school (both for direct and higher-order links), as well as the number of links to non-
program schools and these are represented by the vector  ij N . Given the randomized design of the original 
deworming program, the number of social links to early treatment schools is randomly assigned 
conditional on total links to other program schools. The interpretation of the coefficient on the total 
number of links is complicated by the possibility that more sociable individuals (i.e., those able to name 
more social links) differ from less sociable people in certain unobserved dimensions. However, given the 
design, this does not affect the estimated impact of early treatment links since the number of early 
treatment links is orthogonal to the error term conditional on total named links. 
The cost-sharing indicator variable, COSTj, takes on a value of one for schools participating in the 
cost-sharing project, where the financial cost of treatment was higher. Zij is a vector of additional 
household socioeconomic characteristics (parents’ education and asset ownership), demographic 
characteristics (respondent fertility), and other controls (respondent membership in community groups, 
and a Group 2 indicator) that may affect real or perceived deworming benefits and costs. Idiosyncratic   22
disturbance terms are allowed to be correlated within each school as a result of common influences, such 
as headmaster efforts in promoting the program. Equation 6 presents the main probit specification: 
(6)   ) 1 Pr( = ij T } { 3 2 1 ij ij j ij
E
ij e b Z COST b b N a N + ′ + + ′ +
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We include interaction terms between household characteristics and social links to estimate 
heterogeneous treatment effects, for example, as a function of respondent education, and also estimate 
effects of different types of social connections (e.g., links to relatives versus friends). 
To validate the identification strategy, we first confirm that the randomization succeeded in 
creating program groups balanced along observable dimensions: the number of direct (first-order) social 
links and second- and third-order exposure to early treatment schools, as well as the Group 2 indicator 
variable and the cost-sharing indicator, are not significantly associated with most observable household 
characteristics (Table II), including parent years of education, community group membership (e.g., 
women's or farming groups), or the total number of children in the household, or with household ethnic 
group or religious affiliation variables (ethnic and religious results not shown).  The numbers of first 
order and second order early links are, however, positively and significantly associated with iron roof 
ownership in one specification (Table II, regression 4), and we thus include these controls in most 
specifications below to control for any independent effects they may have on take-up. The measure of 
second-order links to early treatment schools is significantly associated with moderate to heavy infection 
in 2001 at the 10% level, but the coefficient is small (and, surprisingly, positive). Third-order links to 
early treatment schools are not significantly associated with any observable characteristics.   
 
B. Nonexperimental Social Effect Estimates 
We first present nonexperimental social effect estimates. In a specification similar to many existing 
studies, we examine the take-up rate of children in a predefined local social unit—here the primary 
school—as the key explanatory variable. We find that the local school treatment rate (excluding the 
respondent) is strongly positively correlated with take-up, as expected, with coefficient estimate 0.84   23
(standard error 0.11—Table III, regression 1). Take-up among children who are members of the 
respondent’s own ethnic group in their school is somewhat more influential than take-up in other ethnic 
groups (regression not shown), a finding similar to Munshi and Myaux [2002], although in our case we 
argue that this pattern is likely due to omitted variable bias rather than to actual social learning as they 
claim in their context. Similarly, there is a positive, though not statistically significant relationship 
(estimate 0.015, standard error 0.011, regression 2) between the number of treated first-order links named 
in the survey (among those attending the respondent’s school) and take-up, in a specification similar to 
several other recent studies [Kohler et al., 2001; Bandiera and Rasul, 2005]. 
 Social links’ experiences with deworming may also affect individuals’ choices. In particular, we 
test whether take-up is higher when first-order links had “good” experiences with the technology, as in 
Conley and Udry [2000].  Having more links whose children had “good effects” is not associated with 
higher take-up, but those who had more links with “side effects” are somewhat less likely to be treated 




C. Experimental Social Effect Estimates 
Experimental social effect estimates are markedly different from the nonexperimental estimates above, 
suggesting that omitted variable bias in the nonexperimental estimates is large and positive. We begin by 
considering direct first-order social effects to be comparable with existing work, before moving onto 
higher-order social effect estimates. 
Each additional direct parent social link to an early treatment school is associated with 3.1 
percentage points lower likelihood that the respondent’s children received deworming drugs in 2001, and 
this effect is significantly different from zero at over 95% confidence (Table IV, regression 1 presents 
marginal probit estimates evaluated at mean values). This suggests that the respondent’s small, self-
defined social network has a major impact on treatment choices: having two additional early treatment 
links (roughly a one standard deviation increase) reduces take-up by 6 percentage points.   24
This result cannot simply be due to imitation, or to social effects related to learning about how to 
use the new technology, since the overall effect is negative. This implies that learning about the benefits 
of the technology plus the infection externality, taken together, are negative and larger in magnitude than 
the sum of the effect of imitation and the effect due to learning to use the technology. A quadratic term in 
parent social links to early treatment schools is also statistically significantly different from zero at 95% 
confidence in some specifications (Appendix Table A.I., regression 1). However, this quadratic term is 
not significant for interactions with household characteristics nor is the quadratic second-order early 
treatment exposure term statistically significant (regressions not shown), so we principally focus on the 
linear measure for simplicity in what follows.
17 
None of the demographic or socioeconomic controls is significantly associated with 2001 take-up 
except for distance from home to school, which is negatively related to take-up and large: take-up drops 
nearly two percentage points for each additional kilometer from home to school (using GPS measures). 
Distance apparently makes it costlier for parents to walk to school to provide written consent for 
deworming and for children to attend school, a first piece of empirical evidence that take-up is sensitive to 
treatment costs. Parent years of education (typically maternal education in our sample) is positively but 
not statistically significantly associated with higher take-up (point estimate 0.003, standard error 0.003, 
Table IV, regression 1). 
Social effects are more negative for Group 3 schools (point estimate –0.041, Table IV, regression 
2) than for Group 2 (–0.023, the sum of the direct effect of early treatment links and its interaction with 
the Group 2 indicator), although the difference is not statistically significant. This pattern of coefficient 
estimates is reasonable: Group 2 parents had by 2001 already observed the impact of deworming 
treatment in their own household and community and should therefore be less influenced than Group 3 
parents by early links (i.e., in equation 5, 
2
N σ  is smaller for Group 2 parents than Group 3 parents). 
Nonetheless, the persistent influence of early links on Group 2 households after two years of the program   25
is noteworthy. One possible non-Bayesian explanation is that initial pieces of information carry 
disproportionate weight in subsequent decision making [Rabin and Schrag, 1999].
18 
The results are robust to including the proportion of links with children in early treatment schools 
rather than the number of such links (Table IV, regression 3), and to controlling for the total number of 
parent social links nonparametrically using a set of indicator variables (results not shown). An interaction 
between the cost-sharing indicator and the number of early treatment links is imprecisely estimated, but is 
near zero and not statistically significant (estimate -0.013, standard error 0.039 – regression not shown).
19 
Several pieces of evidence suggest that learning takes place not only among individuals with 
strong social ties but also among those with relatively weak ties, along the lines of Granovetter [1973]. 
When the framework is extended to include different types of parent social links – “close” friends, 
defined as those with whom the respondent speaks at least twice a week, versus relatively “distant” 
friends – each additional close link to an early treatment school is associated with 0.030 lower probability 
of deworming treatment in 2001 and the estimated effect of distant links is similar, although not 
statistically significant due to reduced precision (Table IV, regression 4, estimate –0.033, standard error 
0.033).
20 We are similarly unable to reject the hypotheses that social effects are the same for links to 
relatives versus non-relatives, or for members of the respondent’s own ethnic group versus other groups, 
conditional on being named a social link (results not shown).  
Social effects are more strongly negative for respondents with more education (Table IV, 
regression 5). Other studies—most notably Foster and Rosenzweig [1995]—find that educated 
individuals learn most rapidly about new technologies and adopt first. Note that the overall impact of an 
additional year of schooling on deworming take-up remains positive though not statistically significant 
when all the education interaction terms, including the terms interacting education with total links, are 
considered (interaction term coefficient estimates not shown in regression 5). 
Additional social links could have a larger impact on more educated individuals in the theoretical 
framework presented above if they had overly optimistic prior beliefs (φi0) about the drugs, rather than 
any greater receptiveness to new information. Although we cannot decisively distinguish these two   26
explanations empirically, the relation between respondents’ education and their stated belief that 
deworming drugs are “very effective” does provide further evidence supporting the overoptimism model. 
Among Group 3 parents interviewed in Round 1, before deworming treatment was phased into their 
schools individuals who had completed primary school were 17 percentage points more likely to believe 
deworming drugs are “very effective” than parents who had not completed primary school. However, 
several months after deworming had been introduced into their schools, this falls by about half to a 9 
percentage point gap between more educated and less educated Group 3 parents interviewed in Round 2 
(recall that parents were randomly allocated between survey rounds), and there is a similar gap among 
Group 2 parents in 2001, at 10 percentage points, two years after these schools had begun receiving 
treatment. Presenting the result in levels rather than differences, among Group 3 parents who completed 
primary school the perceived effectiveness of deworming also fell dramatically from 59% to 45% from 
Round 1 to Round 2, but fell only slightly among the less educated. To summarize, through exposure to 
deworming over time, views toward the drugs partially converged across parents with different 
educational levels and the drugs were increasingly viewed as ineffective among Group 3 parents. As the 
medical effectiveness of the drugs is well documented, we conjecture that their disillusionment with the 
drugs is due to reinfection. 
We also estimate social effects as a function of child social contacts in early treatment schools 
using the 2001 Pupil Questionnaire data. Average social connections across schools (for the Group 2 and 
Group 3 schools) are very similar for parents and children with a correlation coefficient of 0.92, and this 
complicates the task of distinguishing between parent and child impacts. Among those children aged 13 
years and older, the estimated effect of direct child social links is negative, similar to the parent first-order 
early treatment estimate and statistically significant at over 95% confidence in a specification analogous 
to those in Table IV (point estimate -0.028, standard error 0.012). However, the point estimate is much 
smaller for younger children (-0.006, standard error 0.014 – regressions not shown). Multiple 
interpretations of this pattern are possible, including the possibility that adolescents are more influenced 
by peer information or pressure than younger children, as claimed by Steinberg and Cauffman [1996], or   27
perhaps that younger children are less able to process health information from their social contacts, or that 
the interaction of information from parents and adolescents is particularly influential. 
Unfortunately, we only have limited statistical power to disentangle parent and child impacts or 
to investigate possible interaction effects due to the high correlation of parent and child social networks 
and because matched information on both parent and child social networks exists for only a limited subset 
of children, reducing the sample size in the child network regressions by over half. When parent and child 
first order social links to early treatment schools are both included as explanatory variables, both 
coefficient estimates remain negative but are no longer statistically significant due to the large increase in 
standard errors (regression not shown).
21 
We next consider higher-order exposure to early treatment schools through parent social 
networks. After reproducing the main direct first-order social link result (Table V, regression 1), we 
examine the impact of second-order exposure to early treatment schools, where second-order links are 
constructed using school average connections, and find that second-exposure to early treatment schools is 
also associated with significantly lower deworming drug take-up in 2001 (estimate -0.035, standard error 
0.013, regression 2), conditional on total second-order exposure to all program schools. When both first-
order and second-order social networks terms are included, the estimated second-order effect is -0.047, 
nearly identical to the average first-order effect of -0.044, and both effects are statistically significant at 
high levels of confidence (regression 3). While the theoretical framework predicts that coefficients should 
decline monotonically for higher-order links along the transition path to steady state (since information 
from more distant social links is less likely to have reached the individual), we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the coefficient estimates on the first-order and second-order links are equal or that first-
order effects are somewhat more negative, so we do not emphasize this difference. An increase of one 
standard deviation in second-order early treatment school exposure is associated with a very large 19 
percentage point reduction in deworming take-up. Mirroring the first-order results, more total second-
order exposure to all schools (not just early treatment schools) is associated with higher take-up, which   28
we interpret as reflecting a positive correlation between overall individual “sociability” and positive 
priors toward deworming in our sample. 
The negative second-order effects we estimate suggest that higher-order links can affect behavior 
not only by influencing the take-up behavior of first-order links, but also through changing the 
information of first-order links. To see this, note that theoretically one could imagine negative imitation 
effects, if people like to be different than their neighbors. However, a model in which higher-order links 
affect behavior only through changing the behavior of intermediate links (such as a pure imitation model) 
would imply that the impact of second order link adoption should be equal to the square of the first-order 
link effect of -0.044, or 0.002. Given the results below ruling out large infection externalities at the level 
of individual social contacts, the large negative coefficient on second-order adoption we estimate thus 
provides additional evidence that diffusion works via information transmission through social networks. 
This negative social learning result holds and is highly statistically significant for both first-order 
and second-order links when the proportion of early treatment exposure is used (Table V, regression 4) 
rather than the number of links. The interaction between second-order early treatment school exposure 
and respondent education remains negative, as was the case for first-order links, but the point estimate is 
not statistically significant (regression not shown). The second-order exposure results also hold if the 
first-order exposure is constructed using average school social network connections in a manner 
analogous to the construction of the higher-order links (coefficient estimate is -0.077, standard error 
0.036, significant at 95% confidence – regression not shown).  
Extending the analysis, we find that third-order exposure to early treatment schools – constructed 
analogously to the second-order links, using school averages for higher-order connections – is not 
statistically significantly associated with deworming take-up, although the point estimate is again 
negative (Table V, regression 5). Within the theoretical framework we outline in Section III, a possible 
explanation for the weaker estimated third order effect is that insufficient time had passed for some third-
order social contacts’ information to reach respondents, perhaps because social contacts only discuss 
deworming infrequently, as suggested by our survey data.   29
 
D. Further Econometric Identification Issues 
The estimated negative peer effect in technology adoption implies that social learning about the benefits 
of deworming and the infection externality taken together are negative and far larger in magnitude than 
any possible social learning about how use the new technology plus imitation effects. Here we argue that 
infection effects cannot empirically explain even a small fraction of the overall direct first-order social 
effect of –3.1% (Table IV, regression 1), since any plausible estimate of the effect of early treatment 
school social contacts on infection status, times the effect of infection on take-up, is much smaller. Thus 
social learning about deworming benefits appears to be the key channel driving our results.  
First, having additional direct social links to early treatment schools is associated with lower rates 
of moderate-heavy helminth infection, as expected (Table II, regression 6), but the effect is small and not 
statistically significant (coefficient estimate –0.3 percentage points, relative to a mean moderate-heavy 
infection rate of 27%).  An additional second-order social link to early treatment schools is even 
associated with a somewhat higher rate of infection, though the estimate is only statistically significant at 
90% confidence.  Note that this relatively weak relationship between early treatment school social links 
and child infection is not inconsistent with the strong infection externality findings in Miguel and Kremer 
[2004]. Worm infections are not transmitted directly person to person but rather through contaminated 
soil and water, and a child’s named social links constitute only a small fraction of all people who defecate 
near the child’s home, school, and church, or who bathe at the same points on Lake Victoria. 
In terms of the second step—from infection status to take-up—prior infection status is not 
significantly associated with drug treatment for either Group 1 in 1998 or Group 2 in 1999 [Miguel and 
Kremer, 2004], or for Groups 2 and 3 in 2001 (results not shown) and the point estimates suggest that 
moderate-heavy worm infection is weakly negatively related to treatment rates.
22  Of course, the cross-
sectional correlation between infection and treatment cannot be interpreted as causal due to omitted 
variables: children from unobservably low socioeconomic status households may have both high infection 
rates and low take-up, for example. However, the treated and untreated children look remarkably similar   30
along many observable baseline socioeconomic and health characteristics [Miguel and Kremer, 2004], 
and the relationship is similar using school-level average infection rates rather than individual data (not 
shown), weakening the case for strong selection into deworming treatment. 
Further evidence that more infected people are not much more likely to take up the drugs is 
provided by the 1999 cross-school infection externality estimates, identified using exogenous program 
variation in the local density of early treatment schools. Although we find large average reductions in 
moderate-heavy worm infection rates as a result of cross-school externalities (an average reduction in 
infection of 0.23, Miguel and Kremer, [2004]), proximity to early treatment schools leads to an average 
reduction in drug take-up of only 0.02, which has the expected sign but is near zero (regression not 
shown). Using this estimate, having a moderate-heavy infection is associated with a 0.02/0.23 = 0.09 
reduction in the likelihood of treatment, and this implies a drop in take-up due to infection first-order 
social effects of only (0.09)*(-0.3%) = 0.03%, rather than the -3.1% overall reduction we estimate.  Even 
if eliminating a moderate-heavy infection reduced the likelihood of drug take-up by a massive 0.5 on 
average (rather than the 0.09 we estimate), health externalities would account only for a (0.5)*(-0.3%) =  
-0.15% reduction in take-up. 
Pupil transfers among local primary schools are another potential concern, but any resulting bias 
would likely work against our findings. For example, parents with more health-conscious social contacts, 
whose children may have been more likely to transfer into early treatment schools to receive deworming, 
may themselves also be more health-conscious and eager to have their own children receive treatment. 
This would bias the estimated social effect upward, in which case our negative social effect estimate 
would be a bound on the true negative effect. In any case, the rate of pupil transfers between treatment 
and comparison schools was low and nearly symmetric in both directions [Miguel and Kremer, 2004], 
suggesting that any transfer bias is likely to be small. 
A related identification issue concerns whether social networks measured in 2001—three years 
after the program started—were themselves affected by the program. Any extent to which health-
conscious individuals became more socially linked to individuals with children in early treatment schools   31
would again lead to an upward bias, working against the negative effects we estimate. However, 
respondents were statistically no more likely to name early treatment links than links to other schools: the 
average number of links to early treatment schools is 1.92, while (Total number of links to PSDP schools) 
x (Total number of Group 1, 2 pupils / Total number of Groups 1, 2, 3 pupils) is nearly identical at 1.91. 
 
E. Parent Attitudes and Knowledge 
Respondents with more direct (first-order) early treatment links are significantly more likely to claim that 
deworming drugs are “not effective” (respondents could choose between “not effective”, “somewhat 
effective” and “very effective”, Table VI, row 1).
23 This is consistent with the hypothesis that some 
people initially thought deworming would provide large and persistent private benefits but learned 
otherwise from their early treatment school contacts. We do not find a significant impact of additional 
early links on beliefs that deworming drugs are “very effective” although the point estimate is negative 
(row 2), nor that the drugs have “side effects” (row 3). This last result is evidence against the possibility 
that drug side effect rumors were the key driver of lower take-up among those with more early treatment 
links. 
Second-order early treatment exposure does not have a statistically significant effect on parents’ 
belief that deworming drugs are “not effective” (regressions not shown). The discrepancy between first-
order and second-order effects on deworming attitudes may be due to the deterioration of information 
quality with higher-order social connections: speculatively, individuals may learn from their higher-order 
social contacts that deworming is basically “not good” even though the precise reason why is lost to them. 
  Although direct first-order early treatment links do affect the belief that deworming drugs are 
“not effective”, they do not affect beliefs that “worms and schistosomiasis are very bad for child health” 
(Table VI, row 4). However, some parents may report what they think the survey enumerator wants to 
hear regarding worms’ health consequences: 92% of respondents claimed that helminth infections are 
“very bad” for child health, even though take-up is much lower than 92%. The number of direct early 
treatment links has no effect on parents’ self-reported knowledge of the ICS (NGO) deworming program,   32
the effects of worms and schistosomiasis , (rows 5 and 6), ) or the deworming treatment status of their 
own child (not shown). It also did not affect their objective knowledge of common worm infection 
symptoms (rows 7 to 10). Respondents could name only 1.8 of ten common symptoms on average.
24 This 
suggests health education messages failed to spread. 
Nonexperimental methods would have suggested different results. The actual number of treated 
social links, and the number of social links with whom the respondent speaks directly about deworming, 
are both positively and significantly related to most deworming attitudes and knowledge outcomes (Table 
VI). The observed positive correlation in outcomes within social networks in the study area appears to be 
due to omitted variables rather than actual peer effects. Those with unobservably more interest in child 
health plausibly discuss worms more frequently with social links, who are themselves more likely to have 
their own children receive treatment.  
 
F. Simulating Take-up along the Transition Path  
The framework in section III suggests that subsidies to take-up will not affect steady state adoption under 
social learning either about how to use new technologies or learning about their benefits, as long as at 
least a subset of the population uses the technology. However, subsidies could potentially have effects 
along the transition path to the steady state. We therefore use the empirical school-to-school social 
connections matrix to simulate the take-up gains along the transition path from a one-time drug subsidy 
for parameter values that match the estimated first-order social effects. We consider a hypothetical 
technology where true private benefits exceed most people’s expectations as it is of more general interest 
to study technologies where social learning could potentially contribute to take-up. 
  The simulation is based on the theoretical framework in section III with several functional form 
assumptions made for tractability. We assume that the health benefits of the technology times 
idiosyncratic utility from using the technology (the γ(Xi)⋅μi term) is uniformly distributed on the interval 
] , [ b b ; assume that everyone in a given school starts out with the same prior belief on benefits but that   33
priors differ across schools (and thus focus on the diffusion of information across schools rather than on 
heterogeneity within schools); and assume that all the social effects we observe are due to learning about 
the benefits of the technology.  
One time period in the simulation roughly corresponds to one month. Information may diffuse 
between schools in each period, but individuals only get an opportunity to adopt the technology once 
every six months (as in the program we study). Our results are qualitatively robust to either shorter (τ = 1) 
or longer (τ = 12) lags between adoption opportunities. For tractability we assume that information 
diffuses instantly within schools.  
We consider parameter values for which the simulated first-order social effects fall within two 
standard deviations of the first-order social effect estimated empirically, though again, we consider 
diffusion of a hypothetical technology for which actual returns exceed prior beliefs, so social learning 
speeds adoption. 
25  While we do not explicitly match parameter values to the empirically estimated 
second-order social effect, the simulated second-order effect is on average close to the estimated second-
order effects.  As in our data, the simulated second-order effect is of a similar magnitude to the simulated 
first-order effect – the difference between the simulated second-order and first-order social effects is on 
average 0.006 (relative to an average simulated first-order effect of 0.02, a slightly smaller magnitude 
than the effect estimated in section IV.C above). 
  For a wide range of parameter values, we find that beliefs about the technology and take-up rates 
converge quickly (within five adoption opportunities) to very close to the correct long-run value. Even in 
a case where signals have high variance (e.g, 
2
ε σ = 9), by the third adoption opportunity the variance of 
posterior beliefs is on average less than 0.01. 
Optimal “seeding” of a particular school with a one-time drug subsidy (in period one) makes little 
difference to total discounted technology take-up. After 30 opportunities to adopt (15 years of a program 
like the one we study), the difference in total discounted take-up between seeding the single “best” school 
– the school that generates the highest total discounted take-up when seeded – versus the average of   34
seeding a randomly chosen school in the sample is negligible (less than 0.01%) for our range of plausible 
parameter values. This finding of small gains to “optimal seeding” is consistent with the largely 
symmetric observed social network structure across schools (section IV.A).  Given that it may be costly to 
identify the optimal school to subsidize, and that those funds could alternatively be spent on subsidizing 
drugs for additional schools (or subsidizing them for a longer period), efforts to target temporary drug 
subsidies to influential “opinion leader” schools appear misguided in our context. 
Finally, even the take-up gains from one-time subsidies to additional schools are quite small on 
average. Since information diffuses rapidly, these gains are primarily comprised of the direct effect of the 
subsidy on take-up in the initial round; the impact of information spillovers is negligible. The indirect 
effects on take-up (through the generation of additional information) are small in magnitude and exhibit 
diminishing returns to additional subsidies. Total discounted take-up increases by only 0.027% (as a 
percentage of take-up in the absence of the subsidy) on average above and beyond the direct effect of the 
subsidy when a single school is subsidized at random.  Going from subsidizing five to ten schools yields 
an additional marginal gain of only 0.016% per school.   
Thus, at least in this particular context, there is little reason to think temporary subsidies will lead 
to a sustainable increase in technology adoption. More generally, even if a hypothetical social planner 
knew the returns to a particular technology were better than people expected, subsidizing even a small 
fraction of the population for a relatively brief period would have been sufficient to assure long-run 
diffusion. In the absence of strong imitation effects, the fact that dynamic gains to subsidizing additional 
schools are small suggest that a “big push” is unnecessary for a technology that spreads naturally – and of 
course is futile in the long-run for a technology where social effects are negative. To be effective in 
boosting adoption, ongoing subsidies appear necessary in that case. 
 
V. The Impact of Subsidies on Drug Take-up   35
In the remainder part of the paper, we examine the effects of three other approaches to making 
deworming sustainable: cost-sharing through user fees (section V), health education lessons (section VI), 
and a mobilization intervention (section VII). 
Cost-sharing through user fees has been advocated as necessary for the sustainability of public 
health services in many less developed countries [World Bank, 1993b]. Revenues from these fees could 
be used to improve the quality of health services (i.e., through expanded drug availability) or to fund other 
government expenditures. User fees could theoretically promote more efficient use of scarce public 
resources if those in greatest need of health services are willing to pay the most for them. 
Several non-experimental studies from Africa have found large drops in health care utilization 
after the introduction of user fees (e.g., McPake [1993], Meuwissen [2002]), including in Kenya, where 
Mwabu et al. [1995] find utilization fell by 52% in 1989. Our analysis uses random assignment to 
estimate the effect of cost sharing.
26 The theoretical framework in section III suggests that increasing the 
monetary cost of deworming should lead to lower drug take-up, but the actual elasticity of demand needs 
to be estimated. 75% of households in the free treatment schools received deworming drugs in 2001 
(Table I, Panel C), while the rate was only 19% in cost-sharing schools (the survey data used in these 
regressions is described in Section IV). A regression analysis suggests the small fee reduced treatment by 
62 percentage points (Table VII, regression 1), with the effect similar across households with various 
socioeconomic characteristics (regression 2).
27 This negative effect of monetary cost is consistent with 
our finding (in Table IV) of large negative effects of household distance to the school, which proxies for 
the time costs as parents need to walk to school to provide written consent.  
The drop in take-up in cost-sharing schools cannot be attributed to the hypothesis that user fees 
help ensure that scarce health resources are directed to those who need them most.  In fact, sicker pupils 
were no more likely to pay for deworming drugs: the coefficient estimate on the interaction between 2001 
helminth infection status and the cost-sharing indicator is not statistically significant (not shown). 
Variation in the deworming price per child was generated by the fact that cost-sharing came in the 
form of a per family fee, so that parents with more children in the primary school in 2001 effectively   36
faced a lower price per child. Cost-sharing reduced treatment rates regardless of the per child price that 
the household was required to pay (Table VII, regression 3).  Ariely and Shampan’er [2004] similarly find 
sharp decreases in demand for goods with a small positive price relative to goods with a zero price in lab 
experiments. This regression specification also includes the inverse of the number of household children 
in primary school and the total number of household children of all ages as additional explanatory 
variables to control for the direct effects of household demographic structure on deworming drug demand 
and thus to isolate the price effect. However, we cannot explicitly control for the interaction between 
family size and price changes given the school-level randomization design. 
The cost-sharing results suggest that introducing a small positive user fee is a particularly 
unattractive policy in this context, since it dramatically reduces take-up while raising little revenue, and 
typically requires considerable administrative cost. Yet this is precisely the approach that many less 
developed countries, including Kenya, have adopted in the health sector [World Bank, 1994; McPake, 
1993]. The net public cost per pupil treated in our program under a full subsidy was US$1.478. Assuming 
a US$15 per school fixed cost of visiting a school (which we base on actual field costs), and a US$0.03 
cost per pupil of collecting funds, the net public cost per student treated under cost sharing was 
US$1.374. Pupils contributed about US$0.30 additionally in cost-sharing schools.  For a fixed public 
budget B, the difference between the total number of students treated under cost-sharing versus under a 
full subsidy in this case will be (B/1.374) – (B/1.478) = B*0.0512.  The extra revenue collected from the 
private sector under cost-sharing will be US$0.30*(B/1.374) = B*0.2183.  The cost per additional student 
treated under cost-sharing is thus (B*0.2183)/(B*0.0512) = US$4.26.  One can understand why a program 
administrator with a fixed public budget might institute cost-sharing, but since the cost per additional 
student treated under a full subsidy would be only US$1.478, the deadweight cost of taxation would have 
to be enormous to make it rational for governments to seek to finance deworming out of user fees rather 
than through taxation. 
It is worth bearing in mind the sequencing of the current project in interpreting the cost-sharing 
results. Prior to the program fewer than 5% of people reported taking deworming drugs [Miguel and   37
Kremer, 2004]. The schools received free treatment for two or three years, after which half the Group 1 
and 2 schools were assigned to cost-sharing, following NGO policy. One rationale behind this sequencing 
was that people may be more likely to spend money on a new product if they can first try it and witness 
its benefits first-hand. However, some could argue that it is essential to introduce cost-sharing from the 
outset, because after becoming accustomed to free treatment people will develop a sense of entitlement 
and will refuse to pay when positive prices are later introduced. Although we are unable to directly test 
either hypothesis here given the study design, it is worth noting that there was no significant difference in 
the impact of cost-sharing on take-up across Group 1 and Group 2 schools despite their differing lengths 
of exposure to free treatment (three versus two years, respectively – regression not shown), exposure that 
could theoretically have provided a stronger sense of entitlement among Group 1 households. 
The huge drop in take-up with cost-sharing and the extremely low level of private deworming 
purchases both suggest that most households in the study area place little value on deworming drugs. 
Even if deworming is socially beneficial, perceived private gains were smaller than private costs for most 
households under the cost-sharing regime. The social learning results indicate that additional information 
about deworming through social contacts only reinforces this view, further depressing adoption. 
 
VI. The Impact of Health Education 
There were no significant differences across treatment and comparison school pupils in early 1999 (one 
year into the program) on the three worm prevention behaviors that the program emphasized: pupil 
cleanliness (of the hands and uniform) observed by enumerators
28, the proportion of pupils observed 
wearing shoes, or self-reported exposure to fresh water (Table VIII, Panel A). The results do not vary 
significantly by pupil age, gender, or grade (results not shown). As we found with cost-sharing for 
deworming drugs, individuals appear unwilling to take a costly private action – here, buying shoes for 
their children or adopting new hygiene practices – that help to combat worms in their local community. 
One alternative explanation is that treatment school children neglected to adopt worm prevention 
practices precisely because they were also taking deworming drugs and thus (falsely) felt protected from   38
re-infection. This does not seem to explain the lack of health education impacts, however, since there was 
no evidence of behavioral change even among older girls who did not receive the medical treatment (due 
to concerns about potential embryotoxicity, Table VIII, Panel B).  The lack of basic knowledge about 
worm infections in this area makes remote the possibility that older girls in treatment schools neglected to 
adopt better worm prevention practices because they realized that they were benefiting from spillovers. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that other children benefiting from treatment spillovers changed 
their prevention behavior: children attending comparison (Group 2) primary schools located near 
deworming treatment schools in early 1999 showed large reductions in worm infection levels [Miguel and 
Kremer, 2004] but they did not receive health education, and there was no significant change in their 
worm prevention behaviors either (Table VIII, Panel C), although one limitation of this analysis is that 
these cross-school effects are very imprecisely estimated. 
Although we cannot directly measure the depreciation of knowledge, other researchers find that 
depreciation of health education knowledge and practices is often rapid even in settings where direct 
short-run program impacts were positive (Aziz et al. [1990], Haggerty et al. [1994], Hoque et al. [1996]). 
 
VII. The Impact of Commitment 
Advocates of the sustainability approach in development argue that projects should only be implemented 
if there is local “ownership”, often conveyed by beneficiaries making an affirmative commitment to the 
project. In the project we study, for instance, treatment took place only after the community collectively 
decided to participate during a village meeting. 
The notion of ownership also relates to the claim in social psychology that asking individuals 
whether they plan to take an action will make it more likely that they go through with it. A number of 
studies suggest that individuals can be motivated to take socially beneficial, but individually costly, 
actions by being asked whether they intend to perform them. Most people answer that they do and many 
then feel motivated to follow through with their commitment. For example, Cioffi and Garner [1998] find 
large impacts of such commitments on blood donation on a U.S. university campus. (Greenwald et al.   39
[1987] find such effects for voting behavior among university students in the United States, but in recent 
work Smith et al. [2003] fail to reproduce this finding using a much larger and more representative 
sample of U.S. voters.) 
  In an application of this technique, a random subsample of pupils in PSDP schools were asked 
whether they would take deworming drugs in the upcoming treatment round, in an attempt to boost drug 
take-up without providing additional external subsidies. During 2001 Pupil Questionnaire administration, 
a random subsample of pupils were asked whether they were planning to come to school on the treatment 
day and whether the PSDP workers should bring pills for them on that day: 98% of children answered 
“Yes” to both questions. All pupils interviewed – including both those offered the opportunity for verbal 
commitment and those not offered this opportunity – were provided the same information on the effects 
of deworming and the upcoming date of medical treatment. (All respondents were, of course, also 
informed that participation in data collection and treatment was voluntary.) 
The verbal commitment intervention failed, reducing drug take-up by one percentage point in 
2001, although this effect is not statistically significant (Table IX, regression 1). This result is robust to 
controls for pupil age and gender (regression 2), and the impact of the intervention did not vary 
significantly with child characteristics (regression 3). The effect is somewhat more negative for pupils in 
cost-sharing schools and those with moderate-heavy worm infections, although in neither case are the 
estimates on these interactions significantly different than zero (results not shown). 
These results underscore the need for further research clarifying when and where marketing 
techniques based on prior commitments have an impact. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
A program which provided free deworming drugs for primary school students led to high drug take-up, 
large reductions in moderate-heavy worm infections, and increased school participation, all at low cost. 
Most of the deworming program benefit was in the form of externalities due to reduced disease   40
transmission [Miguel and Kremer, 2004]. Yet mass deworming treatment programs like the one we study 
are rare, and one in four people worldwide still suffer from these easily treated infections. 
One reason for this failure is that rather than allocating funding on the basis of a standard public 
finance analysis, development agencies often prefer to fund “sustainable” interventions that do not require 
continued external funding. We examine several “sustainable” approaches to worm control in this paper, 
including cost-recovery from beneficiaries, health education, and individual mobilization and find all 
were ineffective at combating worms relative to the provision of free deworming drugs. The fact that drug 
take-up fell as more individuals were exposed to deworming through their social network is consistent 
with the idea that private valuation is low and casts doubt on the notion that a temporary intervention 
could lead to a sustainable long-run increase in deworming take-up through a process of social learning in 
this context. The analysis suggests people learned about the private benefits of deworming but provides 
no evidence for large pure imitation effects. Our model suggest that in the absence of such effects, 
expending temporary subsidies beyond a small number of people will not affect long-run take-up.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that continued subsidies may be needed to control diseases 
characterized by large positive treatment externalities, like worms. In Africa, where half the disease 
burden is associated with infectious and parasitic diseases [WHO, 1999], this means extensive and 
indefinite health care subsidies may be needed to adequately address public health problems. 
A broader lesson of this paper is that it may be difficult for external interventions to promote 
sustainable voluntary local public good provision. If local public goods are to be provided, they will 
likely have to be paid for by tax revenue collected either by local governments, national governments, or 
by external donors.  Standard theories of fiscal federalism suggest local governments might be best suited 
to this task, but in Kenya as in many other developing countries, there are no locally elected bodies with 
taxation powers or control over revenue, perhaps because this could threaten central government primacy 
by creating rival power centers. National governments in Africa have not historically supplied deworming 
and have a poor record on local public goods provision. Donors have sometimes provided local public   41
goods, but typically not on a long-term basis. Rather they often structure projects so as to be able to claim 
they are sustainable.  
Donors may simply choose not to provide local public goods under these circumstances, or they 
may choose to provide them on an ongoing long-run basis, but there is little economic rationale for 
pursuing the illusion of sustainability. Even if donors wish to fund investment activities rather than 
consumption, there is little reason why they should seek projects that are sustainable on a project-by-
project basis rather than taking a broader view of what constitutes a good investment. For instance, a 
public health project providing subsidized deworming may not be financially sustainable by itself in the 
short-run – in the sense that communities will not voluntarily provide it – but it will help children obtain 
more education and this can contribute to long-run development for society as a whole. If donors are 
concerned that projects such as roads or wells will go awry without regular maintenance, they could 
endow funds earmarked for this purpose rather than counting on potentially illusory voluntary local 
contributions for maintenance. 
Why then do aid agencies place so much emphasis on financial sustainability? 
We believe that rather than reflecting an economic social welfare calculation on behalf of 
optimizing donors, this reflects the politics of aid and principal-agent problems between aid agencies and 
their ultimate funders in wealthy countries, who are generally ill-informed about conditions in countries 
receiving aid. Aid agencies competing for limited donor funds have incentives to make bold claims about 
what their programs can achieve.  In the short-run, these claims may be useful fundraising tools if the 
ultimate funders find it impossible to distinguish between, say, genuine claims regarding the temporary 
health benefits of providing free deworming medicine (as in the project we study) versus overstated 
claims about the permanent benefits of a one-time worm prevention health education intervention. 
Individual claims about spectacular project “bang for the buck” typically remain unchallenged since aid 
agencies are not directly accountable to their programs’ beneficiaries through either political mechanisms 
(e.g., democratic elections) or through the market mechanism, and rigorous development program 
evaluations remain rare.   42
In the longer-term, of course, pursuing sustainability leads to failed projects, disillusionment 
among donors, and the search for the next development panacea. Rather than pursue the illusion of 
sustainability, development organizations and developing country governments would be better off 
rigorously evaluating their projects, ultimately identifying a limited number with high social returns, and 




Appendix Table A.I 
Robustness of social effect results – parent networks 
 
          
 Dependent  variable: 
  Child took deworming drugs in 2001 
  Probit Probit Probit Probit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
# Parent links with children in early treatment schools 












      
{# Parent links with children in early treatment schools 





   
      
# Pupils in early treatment schools < 3 km from home 
(per 1000 pupils) 
    - 0 . 2 0
*** 
(0.07) 
      
# Pupils in all schools < 3 km from home 
(per 1000 pupils) 
    0.14
** 
(0.07) 
      
Parent social links controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other household controls  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Ethnic, religious controls  No  No  Yes  No 
      
Number of observations (parents)  1678  1678  1678  1678 
Mean of dependent variable  0.61  0.61  0.61  0.61 
          
 
Notes: Data from 2001 Parent Survey, and 1999 and 2001 administrative records.  Probit estimation, robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Disturbance terms are clustered within schools. Significantly different than zero at 99 (***), 
95 (**), and 90 (*) percent confidence. Parent social links controls include total number of parent links, number of 
parent links to Group 1, 2, 3 schools (not own school), and number of parent links to non-program schools.  Other 
household controls include respondent years of education, community group member indicator variable, total 
number of children, iron roof at home indicator variable, and distance from home to school in km, as well as the 
Group 2 indicator and Cost-sharing school indicator. 
 
Ethnic controls include indicators for Luhya-Samia, Luhya-Nyala, Luo, Luhya-Khayo, Luhya-Marachi, and Teso 
groups, and an indicator for being a member of the largest ethnic group in the school (which is near zero and 
statistically insignificant).  Religion controls include indicators for Catholic, Anglican, Pentecostal, Apostolic, Legio 
Mario, Roho, and Muslim faiths, and an indicator for being a member of the largest religious group in the school 
(which is negative and marginally statistically significant).  In regression 2, no household controls are included as 
explanatory variables other than the standard social link controls from Table IV. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1. Refer to the Oxfam website for the details (http://www.oxfam.org.uk/about_us/history/history2.htm). 
 
2. Sustainability has other meanings, including an environmental meaning, but we focus on financial sustainability. 
 
3. Lengeler [1999] reaches similar conclusions. 
 
4. Refer to Adams et al. [1994], Corbett et al. [1992], Hotez and Pritchard [1995], and Pollitt [1990]. 
 
5. The project followed the standard practice at the time in mass deworming programs of not treating girls of 
reproductive age – typically aged 13 years and older in practice – due to concern about the possibility that 
albendazole could cause birth defects [WHO, 1992; Cowden and Hotez, 2000]. The WHO recently called for this 
policy to be changed based on an accumulating record of safe usage by pregnant women (see Savioli et al. [2003]). 
 
6. This figure is based on an estimate that each health education teacher taught two full hours on worm prevention 
behaviors in each grade per school year (given an annual teacher salary and benefits of approximately US$2,000), 
and that the NGO team also provided two hours of health education per school per year. 
 
7. Kenyan per capita income was US$340 [World Bank, 1999], and incomes may be even lower in Busia. 
 
8. Geissler studies an ethnically Luo population (Luos speak a Nilotic language). The majority of our sample are 
ethnically Luhya (a Bantu-speaking group) though Luos are four percent of our sample. However, traditional 
Luo,views are closely related to views found among other African groups [Green et al., 1994; Green, 1997]. 
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9. The effect of other people’s treatment choices on the magnitude of private treatment benefits is unclear a priori. 
As a benchmark, if helminth reinfection rates are independent of own current worm load, and if the health burden of 
infection is linear in own worm load, the private health benefits of treatment are independent of others’ choices. If, 
instead, the health costs of infection are convex in worm load, deworming benefits will be greater in an environment 
that is expected to have high exposure to worms in the future. Thus the net private benefits of treatment will be 
lower if others are treated. The opposite holds with concavity. Miguel and Kremer [2004] estimate average 
deworming treatment spillovers and find that they are roughly linear in local treatment rates, but due to data 
limitations have little power to detect nonlinear higher order terms. Here we assume the benchmark linear case. 
 
10. As observed by Watts and Strogatz [1998], the addition of even a few links to a sparsely connected network 
greatly reduces the average path length between any two nodes, so in general information will propagate more 
quickly in more densely connected networks than in the simple tree we consider. 
 
11. Note that infection status will in general be a function of the entire treatment history of the network.  In the 
steady state, however, the equilibrium takeup rate λ* is a sufficient statistic for the entire history since the take-up 
rate is the same in every period. 
 
12. We conjecture that even in the presence of peer effects, if social connections are in a tree network structure as 
modeled here, then subsidizing a small group of tightly socially linked people may be sufficient to ensure adoption 
and further diffusion of the technology, unless private returns are low enough and peer effects strong enough that 
people will not adopt unless a majority of contacts adopt. This is because subsidizing a small group of 
interconnected people will be sufficient to ensure adoption within this group, and once learning takes place within 
the group, adoption can then spread outwards to others. 
 
13. Of course, additional subsidies may be justified if there is learning by doing in production. Here we examine the 
extent to which social learning by consumers generates a case for subsidies.  
 
14. Survey refusal rates were low, as is typical for this region. 13% of households were dropped due to either 
missing network information, treatment information, household characteristics, or difficulty matching across the 
2001 surveys and earlier PSDP datasets. 
 
15. Treatment within a family is highly correlated, as expected, so we use the household as the unit of analysis. 
 
16. The experiences and choices of people in social links’ communities may theoretically affect respondent take-up 
[Munshi, 2004]. For each early treatment school, we computed the average difference in 1999 school participation 
between treated and untreated pupils and use this to classify schools into “large treated minus untreated difference” 
schools (those above the median difference) versus small difference schools. The treated minus untreated difference 
captures the average observed private benefit to deworming in that school. However, the effect of links to early 
treatment schools in large difference schools is not significantly different than the effect in small difference schools. 
Similarly, links to early treatment schools with low take-up do have a somewhat more negative effect on respondent 
treatment rates than links to schools with high take-up, but the difference is not significant (not shown). However, 
omitted variable bias concerns and limited statistical power mean these results should be interpreted cautiously. 
 
17. Given the correlation of information among individuals in the same school, it is theoretically possible that the 
first signal in a particular school would be more influential than subsequent signals. We estimated these effects in 
our data, but due to limited statistical power cannot reject the hypothesis that the first, second, and third links to a 
particular early treatment school all have the same impact on take-up (regressions not shown). 
 
18. A finding that casts some doubt on the “first impressions matter” explanation, however, is the fact that links to 
Group 1 schools (phased in during 1998) have nearly identical impacts as links to Group 2 schools (phased in during 
1999, estimates not shown). Note that the persistent effects of early treatment links on take-up might be reconciled 
with Bayesian learning, though, if individuals believed there was an important school-year specific random 
component to treatment effects, leading them to place extra weight on outcomes in schools other than their own. 
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19. The results are also robust to a specification without socioeconomic controls (Appendix Table A.I, regression 2), 
and to the inclusion of additional ethnic and religious controls, and indicators for whether the respondent is a 
member of the dominant local ethnic and religious group (regression 3); none of the six ethnic group indicator 
variables is significantly related to take-up. The results are similar when the local density of early treatment school 
pupils (located within 3 km of the respondent’s school), and the density of all local primary school pupils, are  
included as controls (regression 4). However, the point estimate on early links falls by more than a third and loses 
statistical significance, possibly because the local density of early treatment schools picks up part of the effect of 
interactions with other individuals not named in the social links roster. An F-test indicates that the early treatment 
social links and local density of early treatment pupils terms are jointly significant at 99% confidence. 
 
20. Using another definition of link strength yields similar results. While most links were provided in response to 
questions about the individuals with whom the respondent speaks most frequently, others were provided in response 
to prompts about contacts in particular local schools. There is not a statistically significant difference in the effects 
of “unprompted” and “prompted” links (in fact, prompted links are somewhat more influential—not shown). 
 
21. Refer to the working paper version [Miguel and Kremer, 2003] for further discussion of child social effects. 
 
22. The 2001 worm infection results are for a subsample of only 745 children who were randomly sampled for stool 
collection and were present in school on the day of the parasitological survey. Due to the relatively small sample 
size, we do not focus on the parasitological data in the main empirical analysis. 
 
23. A fourth option, “effective, but the worms come back” was rarely chosen by respondents.  
 
24. The ten symptoms (row 7) include fatigue, anemia, weight loss, stunted growth, stomach ache, bloated stomach, 
blood in stool, worms in stool, diarrhea, and fever. Parents were asked: “Could you name the symptoms of worm 
and schistosomiasis infections?” and their unprompted responses were recorded by the enumerator. 
 
25. We focus on the following range of parameter values for the model: b =0, b =2, 
2
0 σ =1, 
2
ε σ =1 to 10, C=0.1 to 
2, φ=0.75, τ=6, annual discount rate δ=0.9 to 1, and p=0.05 to 0.2.  In the simulation, we assume that all students 
within a school receive separate signals and exchange information.  However, to compensate for making this 
extreme assumption, we also assume there are only a maximum of 50 possible signals that can be received per 
school with full take-up; with more signals per school, convergence is even faster.  Given b and b , varying C 
between 0.1 and 2 covers all of the relevant cases.  Similarly, fixing 
2
0 σ , choosing various values for 
2
ε σ  covers all 
of the interesting cases, since only their relative magnitudes influence weight placed on signals versus prior beliefs.  
The simulation code and complete results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
26. Gertler and Molyneaux [1996] find that utilization of medical care is highly sensitive to price in an experimental 
study in Indonesia, but since the unit of randomization in their analysis is the district, and their intervention affected 
only eleven districts, statistical power is relatively low. In a large-scale experimental study, Manning et al. [1987] 
find in contrast that the price elasticity of demand for medical services in the United States is a modest –0.2. 
 
27. Results are unchanged if Group 1 households are included in the analysis (results not shown). They are excluded 
here since they lack the social networks data that we use as explanatory variables here and in Section 4 above. 
 
28. This also holds controlling for initial 1998 cleanliness or using differences-in-differences (regressions not 
shown). 
   49
   50
Table I 
Summary statistics 
       
  Mean Std  dev.  Obs. 
Panel A: Parent Social Links (Round 1 and Round 2 Data)       
Total direct (first-order) links  10.2 3.4 1678 
With children in own school  4.4 2.8  1678 
With children not in Group 1, 2, or 3 schools  3.0  2.4  1678 
With children in Group 1, 2, 3 schools – not own school  2.8  2.4  1678 
With children in Group 1, 2 schools – not own school (“early treatment”)   1.9  2.0  1678 
With children in Group 1 schools – not own school  0.9  1.4  1678 
Proportion with children in early treatment schools  0.66  0.37  1358 
With children in early treatment schools, with whom respondent speaks at least twice per week (“Close Links”)  1.2  1.6  1678 
With children in early treatment schools, with whom respondent speaks less than twice per week (“Distant Links”)  0.7  1.1  1678 
Second-order exposure to Group 1, 2 or 3 schools (not own school), through parent links  4.5  4.1  1678 
Second-order exposure to early treatment schools (Groups 1 and 2, not own school), through parent links  2.9  2.9  1678 
Third-order exposure to Group 1, 2 or 3 schools (not own school), through parent links  3.9  5.3  1678 
Third-order exposure to early treatment schools (Groups 1 and 2, not own school), through parent links  2.8  4.1  1678 
     
Panel B: Parent Social Links (Round 2 Data)     
With children in own school who received deworming 1.5  2.2  886 
With children in early treatment schools who received deworming 0.31  0.89 886 
With children in early treatment schools who received deworming and had “good effects” (according to respondent) 0.21 0.76 886 
With children in early treatment schools who received deworming and had “side effects” (according to respondent) 0.02  0.18  886 
With children in early treatment schools who received deworming, respondent does not know effects 0.10  0.43  886 
With children in early treatment schools, respondent does not know whether they received deworming 1.34  1.77  886 
With children in early treatment schools who did not receive deworming 0.05 0.31 886 
     
Panel C: Deworming Treatment Take-up     
Took deworming drugs in 2001 (Group 2 and 3)  0.61  0.49  1678 
Proportion deworming drug take-up in 2001, respondent’s own school  0.61  0.28  1678 
Took deworming drugs in 2001, free treatment schools  0.75  0.43  1251 
Took deworming drugs in 2001, cost-sharing schools  0.19  0.39  427 
Provided parental consent for deworming drugs in 2001  0.76  0.43  1678 
     
Panel D: Cost-Sharing Interventions     
Cost-sharing school indicator  0.25 0.43 1678 
Cost-sharing school indicator, albendazole only treatment  0.17  0.38  1678 
Cost-sharing school indicator, albendazole and praziquantel treatment  0.08  0.27  1678 
Effective price of deworming per child (Kenyan shillings)  6.3  15.7  1678 
       
Notes: From 2001 Parent Questionnaire and NGO administrative records. The “Proportion in early treatment schools” variables exclude respondents with no 
links to program schools (other than their own), hence the reduced sample since the denominator is zero in that case.    51
Table II 
Validating the randomizations (Group 2 and Group 3 households) 
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Other social link controls, socio-economic controls 
(excluding dependent variable) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Number of observations (parents)  1678  1678  1678  1678  1678  745 
Mean (s.d.) of dependent variable  4.6 (3.9)  0.58 (0.49)  5.5 (2.3)  0.61 (0.49)  1.7 (2.0)  0.27 (0.45) 
             
 
Notes: Data from 2001 Parent Survey, 2001 Parasitological Survey, and 2001 administrative records.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Disturbance terms 
are clustered within schools.  Significantly different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), and 90 (*) percent confidence.  The socioeconomic controls include 
Respondent years of education, Community group member, Total number of children, Iron roof at home, and Distance from home to school (but when any of 
these is the dependent variable, it is not included as an explanatory variable). The other social link controls include # Parent links with children not in Group 1, 2, 
or 3 schools, and # Parent links, total.  52
 
Table III 
Non-experimental social effect estimates (Groups 2 and 3) 
        
  Dependent variable:  
Child took deworming drugs in 2001 
Explanatory variables:  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Proportion deworming drug take-up in 2001, respondent’s own school 





     





     
# Parent links with children in early treatment schools whose children 
received deworming and had “good effects” 
   -0.005 
(0.025) 
     
# Parent links with children in early treatment schools whose children 
received deworming and had “side effects” 
   -0.152
* 
(0.080) 
     
# Parent links with children in early treatment schools whose children 
received deworming and respondent does not know effects 
   -0.004 
(0.049) 
     
# Parent links with children in early treatment schools whose children 
did not receive deworming 
   0.006 
(0.056) 
     
# Parent links with children in early treatment schools, respondent does 
not know whether they received deworming 
   -0.010 
(0.019) 
Total social link controls, socio-economic controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations (parents)  1678  886  886 
Mean of dependent variable  0.61  0.56  0.56 
       
 
Notes: Data from 2001 Parent Survey, and 2001 administrative records.  Marginal probit coefficient estimates are 
presented.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Disturbance terms are clustered within schools.  Significantly 
different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), and 90 (*) percent confidence.  Social links controls include total number of 
parent links, number of parent links to Group 1, 2, 3 schools (not own school), and number of links parent to non-
program schools.  Other controls include respondent years of education, community group member indicator 
variable, total number of children, iron roof at home indicator variable, and distance from home to school in km, as 
well as the Group 2 indicator and Cost-sharing school indicator. Regression 1 presents results from Round 1 and 
Round 2 of the 2001 Parent Survey, and regressions 2 and 3 present results from Round 2 alone, since only Round 2 
has detailed information regarding deworming treatment impacts on social links.  In regression 3, we can reject that 
the coefficient estimates on (# Links with children in early treatment schools whose children received deworming 
and had good effects) and on (# Links with children in early treatment schools whose children received deworming 
and had side effects) are equal at 90% confidence (p-value=0.092).   53
 
 Table IV 
Experimental social effect estimates (Groups 2 and 3) 
         
 Dependent  variable: 
Child took deworming drugs in 2001 
Explanatory  variables:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
# Parent links with children in early treatment schools 







   -0.002 
(0.018) 
       
# Parent links with children in early treatment schools 
* Group 2 school indicator 
 0.018 
(0.029) 
   
       
Proportion direct (first-order) parent links with children in 
early treatment schools 




       
# Parent links with children in early treatment schools, 
with whom respondent speaks at least twice/week 




       
# Parent links with children in early treatment schools, 
with whom respondent speaks less than twice/week 
    -0.033 
(0.033) 
 
       
# Parent links with children in Group 1, 2, or 3 schools, 
not own school, with whom respondent speaks at least 
twice/week 
    0.008 
(0.012) 
 
       
# Parent links with children in Group 1, 2, or 3 schools, 
not own school, with whom respondent speaks less than 
twice/week 
    0.025 
(0.028) 
 
       
# Parent links with children in early treatment schools 
* Respondent years of education 
     - 0 . 0 0 6 2
* 
(0.0032) 
       
# Parent links with children in Group 1, 2, or 3 schools, 









       










       
















       












       












       












       












       
















       













       

















Number  of  observations  (parents)  1678 1678 1358 1678 1678 
Mean  of  dependent  variable  0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 
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Notes: Data from 2001 Parent Survey, and 2001 administrative records.  Marginal probit coefficient estimates are 
presented.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Disturbance terms are clustered within schools.  Significantly 
different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), and 90 (*) percent confidence. Regression 2 also includes interaction terms 
(# Parent social links with children in Group 1, 2, or 3 schools, not own school)*(Group 2), (# Parent social links 
with children not in Group 1, 2, or 3 schools)*(Group 2), and (# Parent social links, total)*(Group 2). Regression 3 
excludes parents for which (# Parent social links with children in Group 1, 2, or 3 schools, not own school) = 0, 
since the proportion of links is undefined, leading to the reduction in sample size.  Regression 5 also includes 
interaction terms (# Parent social links with children in Group 1, 2, or 3 schools, not own school)*(Respondent years 
of education) and (# Parent social links with children not in Group 1, 2, or 3 schools)*(Respondent years of 
education), not shown. 
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 Table V 
First-order and higher-order social effect estimates (Groups 2 and 3) 
         
  Dependent variable: 
  Child took deworming drugs in 2001 
Explanatory variables:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 















Proportion direct (first-order) parent links with children in early treatment schools 
 
























Proportion second-order parent links with children in early treatment schools 
 




Third-order exposure to early treatment schools (Groups 1 and 2, not own school), parent links 
 
       -0.014 
(0.012) 
Third-order exposure to Group 1, 2 or 3 schools (not own school), parent links 
 
       0.008 
(0.01) 
Total social link controls, socio-economic controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations (parents)  1678  1678  1678  1173  1678 
Mean of dependent variable  0.61  0.61  0.61  0.61  0.61 
           
 
Notes: Data from 2001 Parent Survey, and 2001 administrative records.  Marginal probit coefficient estimates are presented.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  Disturbance terms are clustered within schools.  Significantly different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), and 90 (*) percent confidence. Social links 
controls and other controls are included in all specifications.  Social links controls include total number of parent links, number of parent links to Group 1, 2, 3 
schools (not own school), and number of parent links to non-program schools.  Other controls include respondent years of education, community group member 
indicator variable, total number of children, iron roof at home indicator variable, and distance from home to school in km, as well as the Group 2 indicator and 
Cost-sharing school indicator.   
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Table VI 
Effects on deworming attitudes and knowledge 










# Parent links with 
children in early 






# Parent links with 







# Parent links with 













Panel A: Attitudes         











        











        
3) Parent thinks deworming drugs 
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Panel B: Knowledge         











        
6) Parent “knows about the effects 










        
7) Number of infection symptoms 










        
8) Parent able to name “fatigue” as 










        
9) Parent able to name “anemia” as 









        
10) Parent able to name “weight 








        
         
 
Notes: Data from 2001 Parent Survey, and 2001 administrative records.  Marginal probit coefficient estimates are 
presented, and each entry is the result of a separate regression.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Disturbance 
terms are clustered within schools.  Significantly different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), and 90 (*) percent 
confidence.  Social links controls and other controls are included in all specifications.  Social links controls include 
total number of parent links, number of parent links to Group 1, 2, 3 schools (not own school), and number of parent 
links to non-program schools.  Other controls include respondent years of education, community group member 
indicator variable, total number of children, iron roof at home indicator variable, and distance from home to school 
in km, as well as the Group 2 indicator and Cost-sharing school indicator.  The number of observations (parents) 
across regressions ranges from 1656 to 1678 depending on the extent of missing data for the dependent variable. 
 
The ten possible infection symptoms (row 7) include fatigue, anemia, weight loss, stunted growth, stomach ache, 
bloated stomach, blood in stool, worms in stool, diarrhea, and fever.  Parents were asked: “Could you name the 
symptoms of worm and schistosomiasis infections?”, and their responses were recorded by the enumerator. 
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 Table VII 
The impact of cost-sharing  
       
 Dependent  variable: 
Child took deworming drugs in 2001 
Explanatory variables:  (1)  (2)  (3) 































Effective price of deworming per child 
(= Cost / # household children in that school) 
   -0.001 
(0.002) 
     
1 / (# household children in that school) 
 
   -0.35
*** 
(0.07) 
Social links, other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations (parents)  1678  1678  1678 
Mean of dependent variable  0.61  0.61  0.61 
       
 
Notes: Data from 2001 Parent Survey, and 2001 administrative records. Marginal probit coefficient estimates are presented. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Disturbance terms are clustered within schools. Significantly different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), and 90 (*) percent confidence. Social links 
controls include total number of links, number of links to Group 1, 2, 3 schools (not own school), and number of links to non-program schools (as in Table IV 
above). Other controls include respondent years of education, community group member indicator variable, total number of children in the household, iron roof 
at home indicator variable, and distance from home to school in km, as well as the Group 2 indicator (as in Table IV above). 
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 Table VIII 
PSDP health behavior impacts (1999) 
   
      
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 1 – 
Group 2 (s.e.) 
Panel A: Health Behaviors, all pupils (Grades 3-8)       
Clean (observed by field worker), 1999  0.59  0.60  -0.01 
(0.02) 
Wears shoes (observed by field worker), 1999  0.24  0.26  -0.02 
(0.03) 
Days contact with fresh water in past week (self-reported), 1999  2.4  2.2  0.2 
(0.3) 
      
Panel B: Health behaviors, girls ≥ 13 years old      
Clean (observed by field worker), 1999  0.75  0.77  -0.02 
(0.02) 
Wears shoes (observed by field worker), 1999  0.39  0.42  -0.03 
(0.06) 
Days contact with fresh water in past week (self-reported), 1999  2.3  2.2  0.0 
(0.3) 
      
 
Panel C: Health behaviors, all pupils (Grades 3-8) 
Overall cross-
school externality 
effect for Group 2 
  
Clean (observed by field worker), 1999  0.09 
(0.21) 
  
Wears shoes (observed by field worker), 1999  -0.01 
(0.08) 
  





       
 
Notes: These results use the data from Miguel and Kremer (2004). These are averages of individual-level data for grade 3-8 pupils; disturbance terms are 
clustered within schools. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), and 90 (*) percent confidence.  
 
The effects in Panel C are the result of a regression in which the dependent variable is the change in the health behavior between 1998 and 1999 (school average), 
and the local density of Group 1 pupils within 3 km (per 1000 pupils), Group 1 pupils within 3-6 km (per 1000 pupils), Total pupils within 3 km (per 1000 
pupils) and Total pupils within 3-6 km (per 1000 pupils) are the key explanatory variables. Grade indicators, school assistance controls (for other NGO 




 Table IX 
The impact of a verbal commitment 
       
 Dependent  variable: 
Child took deworming drugs in 2001 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 























     
Verbal commitment intervention indicator *Age 
 
   -0.003 
(0.010) 
     
Verbal commitment intervention indicator * Female 
 
   0.005 
(0.006) 
Social links, other controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations (pupils)  3164  3164  3164 
Mean of dependent variable  0.54  0.54  0.54 
       
 
Notes: Data from 2001 Parent and Pupil Surveys, and administrative records. Marginal probit coefficient estimates are presented, robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Disturbance terms are clustered within schools. Significantly different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), and 90 (*) percent confidence. Social links 
controls are described in Miguel and Kremer (2003). Other controls include respondent years of education, community group member indicator variable, total 
number of children, iron roof at home indicator variable, and distance from home to school in km, as well as the Group 2 and Cost-sharing school indicators. 
Summary statistics from the 2001 Pupil Questionnaire (Mean [s.d.]): Pupil age (12.9 [2.3]), Pupil female indicator (0.23 [0.42]) (older girls were dropped from 
the sample because they were not eligible for deworming, due to the potential embryotoxicity of the drugs). 
 
 